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Tomasz Kubalica
Critical Metaphysics 
in the Views  
of Otto Liebmann and Johannes Volkelt
Abstract: The article addresses the problem of critical metaphysics in the views 
of Otto Liebmann and Johannes Volkelt. Their view of metaphysics results from a com-
promise between science and philosophy. On the one hand, this compromise keeps 
metaphysics closely in touch with contemporary scientific theory, which means it can 
participate in the modern civilisation of science and technology, on the other though, 
it leads to the narrowing down of the universalist philosophical perspective to sci-
ence, which means abandonment of non-scientific aspects of life. Although in principle 
open to metaphysical needs of humans, critical metaphysics, on this view, embodies 
scientific aspirations of the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. Metaphysical criti-
cism entails self-imposed limits on metaphysical aspirations, but these limitations 
themselves must stay within reasonable limits; otherwise, it transforms into destruc-
tive scepticism.
Keywords: critical metaphysics, universalist view of philosophy, contemporary scien-
tific theory, philosophical criticism, scepticism
The contemporary notion of philosophy understood as critical thought, 
though of ancient origin, was shaped above all by Neo-Kantian philos-
ophy and Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.1 In this context, the opposi-
tion between metaphysics and cognition becomes especially significant, 
where cognition is usually interpreted in the spirit of positivism and sci-
entism in the form of antagonism between dogmatic metaphysical think-
ing and a critical approach, which supposedly excludes the possibility 
of metaphysics. In this context, we must pose the question of whether 
1 Cf. K. Bormann, “Kritik,” in: Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie. Bd. IV. 
Hrsg. v. H. Ritter (Darmstadt: Schwabe, 1976), p. 1249 et passim.
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metaphysics really rejects critical thinking. To answer this lofty ques-
tion, it is necessary to consider the Neo-Kantian concept of metaphys-
ics against the background of Kant’s metaphysical thought, which we 
will begin with. 
The statement is true that Kant’s philosophy arose during the enlight-
enment, when one of the key philosophical issues was the problem 
of the possibility of scientifically practicing metaphysics.2 The impor-
tant issues of obviousness, method, and the certainty of the foundation 
of metaphysics became a key subject in philosophical discussion and also 
inspired Kant—fascinated by the success of Newton’s method in the natu-
ral sciences—to undertake an attempt at consistently applying the New-
tonian principles to the field of metaphysics.3 Criticism in regard to meta-
physics was to ensure both a destructive and constructive result, that is, 
on the one hand, to “guard against false metaphysics,” and on the other, 
to ensure insight into the “properties of things hidden from reason.”4 
In this way, metaphysics is interpreted as criticism, and at the same 
time, as the science of the limitations of cognition and human reason.5 
In the understanding of Helmut Holzhey, Kant’s critique was to ful-
fill the following four tasks:6 (1) The critique was to define the sources 
of metaphysics, its methods and boundaries; (2) It was to partially encom-
pass metaphysics, and partially its propedeutics in the area of nature 
and morality; (3) It was to reduce metaphysical theses and antitheses 
to a third thing; (4) It was to be the study of a subject, that is, to discover 
and prevent the mixing up of the objective and the subjective, and in this 
way to become transcendental philosophy. 
2 Cf. R. Kuliniak, Spór o oczywistość w naukach metafizycznych. Konkurs Królewskiej Akademii 
Berlińskiej z 1763 roku (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 2003), p. 19.
3 Cf. I. Kant, Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels oder Versuch von der Verfassung 
und dem mechanischen Ursprunge des ganzen Weltgebäudes, nach Newtonischen Grundsätzen 
abgehandelt, in: Akademieausgabe von Immanuel Kants Gesammelten Werken, Band I: Vorkritische 
Schriften 1747–1777 (Berlin: Karsten Worm, 1998), pp. 215–368 (AA I, 215–368).
4 “Dieser Nutze ist positiv, die Einsichten zu vermehren; negativ, die falsche metaphysik 
zu verhindern […].” I. Kant, “Reflexionen zur Metaphysik,” 358: 05–06 (Reflexion 3943).
5 Cf. I. Kant, “Reflexionen zur Metaphysik,” 368: 09 (Reflexion 3964).
6 Cf. H. Holzhey, “Kritik…,” p. 1268.
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In this context, the Kantian understanding of metaphysics presented 
in the Critique as the self-criticism of reason is key: 
I do not mean by this a critique of books and systems, but of the faculty of reason 
in general, in respect of all knowledge after which it may strive independently 
of all experience. It will therefore decide as to the possibility or impossibility 
of metaphysics in general, and determine its sources, its extent, and its limits 
all in accordance with principles.7
Such self-criticism is, therefore, to evaluate the foundations 
of the possibility of metaphysics based on the results of an analysis 
of its sources and scope before the tribunal of reason. The aim of such 
a rational judgment is the ending of endless metaphysical debates 
and the shaping of metaphysics according to a mathematical or phys-
ical model, that is, the scientific practice of metaphysics. The task 
is the cleansing of reason of all groundless pretentions on the basis 
of eternal and unchanging laws “that we must never venture with spec-
ulative reason beyond the limits of experience.”8 Such an understand-
ing of criticism is only seemingly negative, since its aim is the con-
flict-less functioning of the faculty of reason’s complex structure. Kant 
assumes that transcending the boundaries of reason does not widen 
our metaphorical cognitive “horizon,” but—to the contrary—narrows 
it as a result of hindering the possibility of distinction by reason.9 
The moral benefit of the transcendental critique of metaphysics is also 
essential; it consists in reason’s self-limitation so that it does not widen 
the boundaries of sensuousness into the field of morality, since moral 
laws cannot be justified on the basis of sensuousness. Criticism under-
stood thusly plays a policing role in the sense that it defines the general 
frame of the harmonious functioning of the faculty of reason’s complex 
structure. 
7 I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1929), A XII.
8 I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B XXIV.
9 Cf. T. Kubalica, “Metafizyka krytyczna Otto Liebmanna,” Folia Philosophica 2014, t. 32, 
p. 51ff.
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 However, along with the above desideratum of delineating the bound-
aries of pure reason, a metaphysical intent of a metaphysical system 
appears in Kant’s Prologomena, when he proposes, “to determine 
the whole sphere of pure reason completely and from general princi-
ples, in its circumference as well as in its contents. This was required 
for metaphysics in order to construct its system according to a reliable 
method.”10 Therefore, criticism is also to play the role of the foundation 
of the system of pure reason.11 In accordance with the accepted distinc-
tion between being and duty, its first part was to be the metaphysics 
of nature, and its second part—the metaphysics of morality.
Kant suggested that a system was needed, though he never achieved 
this goal himself. His idea was taken up by the German idealists, such 
as Karl Leonhard Reinhold, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, and Friedrich Wil-
helm Joseph von Schelling, who wanted to develop the idea of critical phi-
losophy in this way.12 Fichte identified Kant’s critical philosophy with his 
own theory of knowledge and developed it in the direction of a coher-
ent, all-encompassing system, which was derived from the basic prin-
ciples of all human knowledge in a strictly scientific way.13 The refer-
ence of criticism to metaphysics, which Fichte understands as the study 
of the genesis of the content of consciousness, also changes, for reflec-
tion on the possibility of metaphysics, its proper meaning, and laws, 
is of a metaphysical character. Fichte describes the relationship of meta-
physics to criticism in the following way: “Critique itself is not metaphys-
ics, but is located above the area of the latter: critique refers to meta-
physics just like the latter refers to the common opinions of natural 
reason. Metaphysics explains these opinions, and it itself is explain 
in critique. Critique, in the proper sense, critique philosophical thought, 
and if philosophy itself is to be called critical, then we can say that it cri-
10 I. Kant, Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics, trans. P. Carus (Chicago: Open Court, 1902), p. 8.
11 I. Kant, Krytyka czystego rozumu, trans. R. Ingarden (Kęty: Antyk, 2001), A 11 / B 24–26.
12 M. J. Siemek. “Wstęp: Teoria wiedzy jako system filozofii transcendentalnej,” in: Johann 
Gottlieb Fichte, Teoria wiedzy: wybór pism. Vol. I. (Warszawa: PWN, 1996), p. XI.
13 Cf. H. Holzhey, “Kritik…,” p. 1272.
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tiques natural thought.”14 Thus, we are dealing with a certain hierar-
chy of knowledge that runs from natural thought, through metaphys-
ics, up to criticism. The point is to, on the path of meta-reflection, grasp 
the supernatural, i.e. metaphysical, foundations of knowledge absent 
from our natural thought, and, in metaphysical thought, the even deeper 
critical foundations that the theory of knowledge presents; metaphysics 
is a critique of natural thought, and the theory of knowledge is a cri-
tique of metaphysics. In Fichte, criticism was separated from metaphys-
ics, since a pure critique must be non-metaphysical, and pure metaphys-
ics—non-critical. 
As in Kant’s thought, the Neo-Kantian critique of metaphysics served 
above all to guard against metaphysics’ groundless pretentions. In this 
spirit, Friedrich Albert Lange levels both classical and materialistic 
metaphysics with poetry and literature, considering it a form of “concep-
tual poetry” (Begriffsdichtung).15 Metaphysics understood thusly cannot 
provide theoretical explanations of phenomena, as does science, and is 
only able to create words that lack theoretical meaning. Metaphysics 
is understood in this way by Ernst Laas, according to whom metaphysi-
cal methods of explanation are “either simply the repetitions of later-
adopted immanent schemes, as if they were ‘in themselves,’ which can 
only be demonstrated as the ‘contentual’ participation of the proper 
being, which is found in the area between matter and Self, or are ideals 
sketched according to what is needed.”16 Metaphysical views on the sub-
ject of the transcendent being are only projections of physical beings 
cognized within the bounds of immanence. Metaphysics idealizes 
the needs that exist within us. That is why metaphysics belongs more 
14 H. Holzhey, “Kritik…,” p. 10.
15 Cf. F. A. Lange, Geschichte des Materialismus und Kritik seiner Bedeutung in der Gegenwart. 
Hrsg. v. R. Nölle (Norderstedt: Books on Demand, 2008), pp. 483–484.
16 “Und doch: wenn man näher zusieht, so sind sie [die metaphysische Erklärungsweisen—
T.K.] entweder nur Wiederholungen der spät in Cours gekommen immanenten Schemata 
mit der Voraussetzung, als könne »an sich« sein, was man nachweisen nur konnte als Theilinhalt 
des correlativen Seins, das zwischen den Polen Materie und Ich liegt; oder es sind frei nach 
Bedürfnissen entworfene Ideale.” E. Laas, Idealismus und positivismus: Eine kritische 
Auseinandersetzung (Berlin: Weidmann, 1884), p. 248.
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to the domain of literary creation and fiction than science. The anti-
metaphysical position of Laas—Natorp’s teacher—is shared not only 
by the Neo-Kantian Marburg School, but also by the Badenian School 
(Wilhelm Windelband and Heinrich Rickert). For Windelband, meta-
physical “‘conceptual poetry’ cannot, then, objectively fall under the cat-
egory of science, but only in the subjective sense, that it would like 
to be scientifically conducted or considered scientifically conducted, 
though it cannot be conducted scientifically.”17 Thus, the scientific aspi-
rations of metaphysics cannot be acknowledged. Rickert, on the other 
hand—alongside Kantianism and an orientation towards the philoso-
phy of culture—accepted the rejection of the metaphysics of “things-
in-themselves” as one of the common points connecting both schools 
of Neo-Kantianism.18 In the Badenian School, the metaphysics of things 
existing in themselves gives way to the axiology of values, which are 
binding in themselves. 
It is in this context of Kantian and post-Kantian thought that Neo-
Kantianism as a whole must be grasped, though—despite the errone-
ous opinion preserved in Neo-Kantian schools—Neo-Kantianism has 
not completely given up metaphysics. A positive regard for metaphys-
ics in Neo-Kantianism can be seen especially in its metaphysical trend, 
to which such philosophers belonged as Otto Liebmann and Johannes 
Volkelt, Friedrich Paulsen, Erich Adickes, Traugott Konstantin Öster-
reich and Max Wundt.19 What sets them apart above all is that they 
acknowledged the possibility of metaphysics as an empirico-hypothetical 
17 “Ihre »Begriffsdichtungen« können also unter den Begriff der Wissenschaft nicht objektiv, 
sondern nur in einem subjektiven Sinn subsumiert werden, daß sie wissenschaftlich leisten 
wollten und geleistet zu haben glaubten, was sich wissenschaftlich gar nicht leisten läßt.” 
W. Windelband, Präludien. Aufsätze und Reden zur Einleitung in die Philosophie. Bd. I., 3. Aufl., 
(Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1907), p. 26.
18 Cf. H. Rickert, Wilhelm Windelband. 2. Verb. Aufl., (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul 
Siebeck], 1929), p. 17; cf. Ch. Krijnen, Nachmetaphysischer Sinn. Eine problemgeschichtliche 
und systematische Studie zu den Prinzipien der Wertphilosophie Heinrich Rickerts (Würzburg: 
Königshausen & Neumann, 2001), p. 84, footnote 27.
19 Cf. A. J. Noras, Historia neokantyzmu (Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, 2011), 
pp. 258–312. The figure of Max Wundt remains problematic; Janina Kiersnowska-Suchorzewska 
counts him among the Neo-Kantian metaphysicians, while in a biographical sense he belongs 
to the generation of post-Neo-Kantians (Heidegger, Hartmann, Jaspers, Heimsoeth).
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science about things in themselves. This article focuses on the meta-
physical views of Liebmann and Volkelt, as the main representatives 
of this trend. The remaining philosophers held similar views regarding 
the interpretation of Kant’s philosophy and the possibility of metaphys-
ics.20 Paulsen recognizes the possibility and necessity of monistic ide-
alistic metaphysics of a panpsychic and—like Liebmann—parallelistic 
character.21 Erich Adickes conducts systematic studies on the concept 
of the thing-in-itself. Traugott Konstantin Österreich—like Paulsen—
studied the Kantian understanding of metaphysics and stated that criti-
cism does not signify a rejection of metaphysics. Finally, Max Wundt 
emphasized that in Kant’s philosophy, metaphysics and not methodology 
was most important. These thinkers deserve to be discussed separately 
in a different paper. 
Liebmann’s metaphysics
Otto Liebmann, considered a precursor of Neo-Kantianism, in con-
trast to other Neo-Kantian schools, takes a positive position regarding 
the possibility of metaphysics as a theory, which he presented in his 
1884 work entitled Die Klimax der Theorien (The Climax of Theory),22 
where he distinguishes a third metaphysical level of theory next 
to empirical and non-empirical. Liebmann characterizes this metaphys-
ics as follows: “The speculation, theory, or single theorem is metaphysi-
cal, which can rise above all that is relative, and so believes in the possi-
bility of spiritually grasping something absolutely real.”23 Metaphysical 
theory is a reflection that is transcendent regarding experience and pro-
vides absolute principles explaining the world, which corresponds 
to the Kantian concept of metaphysica generalis. Thus, it turns out that 
20 Cf. A. J. Noras, Historia neokantyzmu, p. 289ff.
21 Cf. F. Paulsen, Einleitung in die Philosophie. 2. Aufl. (Berlin: J. S. Cotta’sche Buchhandlung 
Nachfolger, 1893), p. IIIff.
22 Cf. O. Liebmann, Die Klimax der Theorien: eine Untersuchung aus dem Bereich 
der allgemeinen Wissenschaftslehre (Straßburg: Georg Olms, 1884), p. 13ff.
23 O. Liebmann, Die Klimax der Theorien…, p. 38. See also: A. J. Noras, Historia 
neokantyzmu, p. 57.
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the Neo-Kantian Liebmann is not only a known theoretician of cogni-
tion, but also—a metaphysician. 
We can find the key concepts of metaphysical criticism in Lieb-
mann’s work Grundriß der kritischen Metaphysk (An Outline of Criti-
cal Metaphysics). Reflection on our state of knowledge is vital here: 
Unsolved, and partially unsolvable problems, unexplained, and possibly inex-
plicable facts surround our horizon of knowledge on all sides, so human cogni-
tion, like human consciousness in general, emerges from the dark night like 
a brightly-lit island, and precisely due to this brightness the darkness of the sur-
rounding night seems all the darker.24
The sphere of “light” cognizable to us is limited by the completely 
incognizable sphere of “darkness,” which despite this plays an impor-
tant role for us. It is the sphere of ignoramus et ignorabimus that was 
dealt with by mythology and religion, and in our culture the univer-
sal science called metaphysics.25 This need for reference to the “inc-
ognizable” is expressed in the immutable essence of man as a need 
for metaphysics.26 It is expressed in the continual search for solutions 
for the contraries, contradictions, and antinomies that surround us. 
It is the inexhaustible source of the perpetual discussion between 
idealism and realism, spiritualism and materialism, and theism, 
pantheism, and atheism. It turns out that though the object of meta-
physics is not directly accessible to our senses, it should be developed, 
as it is deeply rooted in human nature. The metaphysical skepticism 
which negates the possibility of metaphysics turns out to be a sort 
of inconsistent negative dogmatism, which ignores the internal need 
for metaphysics.27
24 “Ungelöste, zum Theil unlösbare Probleme, unerklärte, vielleicht für immer unerklärliche 
Thatsachen sind es, wovon der Horizont unseres Wissens allseitig umlagert wird; so daß die mensch-
liche Erkenntniß, wie das Bewußtsein des Menschen überhaupt, einer hellbeleuchteten Inseln gleich, 
die aus tiefer Nacht hervortaucht und eben vermöge ihrer Helligkeit das Dunkel jener sie umgeben-
den Nacht um so dunkler erscheinen läßt.“ O. Liebmann, ”Grundriß der kritischen Metaphysk,” in: 
Gedanken und Tatsachen. Bd. 2, (Straßburg: K.J. Trübner, 1904), p. 91.
25 Cf. also: W. Windelband, “Otto Liebmanns Philosophie,” Kant-Studien 15, 1910, p. VIIff.
26 Cf. O. Liebmann, “Grundriß der kritischen Metaphysk,” p. 92.
27 Cf. O. Liebmann, “Grundriß der kritischen Metaphysk,” p. 93.
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Allowing for the possibility of metaphysics does not, however, 
mean the acceptance of all metaphysics. Liebmann rejects dogmatic 
metaphysics, which wrongfully lays claim to absolute importance 
and inerrancy. In the spirit of Cartesian methodical skepticism Lieb-
mann believes that metaphysics should be cleansed of the transcen-
dental dogmatism of appearance of the road of consistent skepticism. 
It is only those metaphysics which have been freed from dogmatism 
that deserve the name of critical metaphysics. Here, we can per-
ceive the inspiration of the Kantian critique of dogmatic metaphys-
ics, understood as a “peremptory science of the essence of things.”28 
Two moments must be distinguished in the genesis of critical meta-
physics: (1) the critical appearance of Kant and (2) the discovery 
of transcendental philosophy. Both were highly significant in rais-
ing the awareness that nothing beyond consciousness and its con-
tent is known or can be known to us. Thus, the unexperienceable 
and beyond-sensory world in itself was deemed inaccessible to sci-
entific cognition, and judgments on thing-in-themselves were given 
the epistemological status of hypothetical opinions. As a conse-
quence, Liebmann limits the function of metaphysics: “Critical meta-
physics […] is confined to the exact consideration of human views, 
human hypotheses on the nature of things.”29 Criticism in metaphys-
ics is based on the acceptance of the hypothetical status of things-in-
themselves and on the drawing of philosophical conclusions from this 
state of affairs, solely within the boundaries of human reason. Thus, 
Liebmann’s approach to metaphysics is of a Kantian character, since 
it is characterized by tension between the authentic human need 
for metaphysics and the necessity of its control by reason. This 
is the path of compromise between metaphysics and modern science, 
well-understood and well-grounded in Kant’s critical philosophy. 
28 O. Liebmann, “Grundriß der kritischen Metaphysk,” p. 112.
29 “Kritische Metaphysik hingegen bescheidet sich, von Kant belehrt, eine strenge 
Erörterung menschlicher Ansichten, menschlichen Hypothesen über das Wesen der Dinge 
zu sein.”O. Liebmann, “Grundriß der kritischen Metaphysk,” p. 113.
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Though this compromise is not a final and universally-satisfying 
solution to the problem of metaphysics, it is not equivalent to oppor-
tunism, since it was achieved with respect for the values and pri-
mary goals of science. The metaphysical task of philosophy is to 
broaden the horizon of thought beyond the boundaries set by sen-
sually-experienced facts, in order to explain the parallel relation 
between the mind and matter. For Liebmann, the experience given 
to us is essentially ambiguous, since it “teaches us […] that mat-
ter and spirit, despite their essential heterogeneity and incompara-
bility, are nomic coherence and a functional correlation with each 
other from beginning to end.”30 Liebmann accepts psychophysical 
parallelism, recognizing the existence of psychic and physical phe-
nomena that appear while not affecting one another. However, this 
parallelism of spirit and matter cannot be demonstrated empirically 
and thus is only a metaphysical hypothesis. 
Moreover, in Liebmann’s critical metaphysics, we find the enjoin-
ment of a teleological anthropomorphic approach with causalistic nat-
ural science,31 for Liebmann believes that a universal finality reigns 
in nature as the necessary condition of its limitedness. The anthropo-
morphic genesis of the metaphysical concept of an end does not exclude, 
in Liebmann‘s opinion, the possibility of a teleological understan-
ding of nature, the evidence for which—outlined by Kant in the Criti-
que of Judgment and later undertaken by Jean Baptiste de Lamarck 
and Étienne Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, and finally by Charles Dar-
win—can be found in the theory of evolution (descendence), among 
other things.32 Liebmann perceives in the evolutionary development 
of the internal needs of organisms with a formed nervous system 
an example of the fact that in describing the foundations of the natu-
30 “[S]ie belehrt uns auf der anderen Seite, daß Materie und Geist trotz aller ihrer gründlichen 
Heterogenität und Unvergleichlichkeit doch durchgängig miteinander in einem gesetzlichen 
Zusammenhang und functionaller Wechselbeziehung stehen.”O. Liebmann, “Grundriß 
der kritischen Metaphysk,” p. 180–181.
31 Cf. O. Liebmann, “Grundriß der kritischen Metaphysk,” p. 141.
32 Cf. O. Liebmann, “Grundriß der kritischen Metaphysk,” p. 162ff.
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ral world, efficient and final causality can be connected without falling 
into contradictions.
Liebmann finds justification for his convictions in the concept 
of the logic of facts, popularized by Ludwig Wittgenstein, which 
means that nature, like man, is directed by internal reason (inter-
nal logic), which he describes in the following way: 
The nature of things possesses for us, and also probably “in itself,” a logical structure, 
since it is under the control of a system of more general, and at the same time more 
specific, but always the same, laws, and is respectively enslaved by these immuta-
ble laws, so as to confirm what man has logically deduced on the basis of consistent 
conclusions drawn from truly cognized laws.33
The logical character of nature is expressed in the fact that if we 
correctly infer on the basis of the true laws of nature, we come to con-
clusions that correspond to reality. The logic of facts is the metaphy-
sical hypothesis that the logical necessity known to us is extended 
into nature in the form of objective necessity. It is on this logic that 
the parallelism of the sensually perceptible and of beyond-sensory 
reality is based. In contrast to the parallelism of Baruch Spinoza, 
Liebmann’s parallelism is of a hypothetical, not absolute, character. 
Four maxims of interpolation (Interpolationsmaximen) consti-
tute the basis of the logic of facts: (1) the principle of real identity, (2) 
the principle of the continuity of existence, (3) the principle of causality, 
and (4) the principle of the continuity of events.34 The principle of real 
identity is to guarantee the identity of objects of experience. The prin-
ciple of the continuity of existence results from the first in reference 
to beings that exist in time and is to guarantee the continual unity 
of a being’s existence in time. The third principle of causality signifies 
33 “Die Natur der Dinge besitzt für uns, vermuthlich also auch »an sich« insofern eine logische 
Struktur, als sie unter der Herrschaft eines Systems allgemeinerer und speciellerer, sich stets 
gleich bleibender Gesetze steht und diesen constanten Gesetzen entsprechend gezwungen ist, 
Dasjenige, was der Mensch durch folgerichtige Schlüsse aus den richtig erkannten Gesetzen 
deducirt hat, factisch zu bestätigen.” O. Liebmann, Die Klimax der Theorien…, p. 53.
34 Cf. H. Schwaetzer, “Otto Liebmanns kritische Metaphysik,” in: O. Liebmann, Die Klimax 
der Theorien…, p. XVI–XVII.
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that the universality and immutability of events’ occurrence results 
from their submission to the hypothetical laws of nature. The principle 
of the continuity of events is a consequence of the third, and means 
that any change in space or quality proceeds in a continuous, not sal-
tatory, manner. Though the principles cited by Liebmann are obvi-
ous, they are not based on experience, but go beyond it, and thus have 
the status of metaphysical presumptions. They are not, in truth, logi-
cal or mathematical axioms, but we have to presume them in all sci-
ences. Their interpolational character signifies that these maxis, though 
not based on experience, allow science to determine the consequences 
to which the facts taken from experience lead. 
Volkelt’s metaphysics
Another example of the metaphysical reflection undertaken by Neo-
Kantians in the critical spirit is the philosophy of Johannes Volkelt, 
who expressed his position regarding the possibility of metaphys-
ics in an inaugural talk entitled Über die Möglichkeit der Metaphysik 
(On the Possibility of Metaphysics) in Basil on October 23, 1883.35 Volkelt 
follows Kant in asking if metaphysics is at all possible, and replies: 
“The answer that Kant established, as we know, is not very reassuring 
for metaphysics. He does, in truth, recognize the need for metaphysics 
as impossible to eradicate, but he fights against satisfying this need sci-
entifically, considering metaphysics based on appearance and illusion. 
With the strength of his spirit and true desire for destruction, he under-
mines the scientific edifice of metaphysics until resorting to rational 
“magicianry” right in front of us. He did, however, allow a certain type 
of metaphysics to emerge on the basis of moral postulates, and this 
metaphysics was even of a quite positive nature.”36 Volkelt considers 
Kant’s answer paradoxically negative and positive at the same time. 
35 J. Volkelt, Über die Möglichkeit der Metaphysik. Antrittsrede gehalten zu Basel am 23. 
Oktober 1883 (Hamburg und Leipzig: Voss, 1884).
36 J. Volkelt, Über die Möglichkeit der Metaphysik…, pp. 3–4.
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This means that Kant simultaneously negated the possibility of the sci-
entific practice of metaphysics in the old sense, but created the founda-
tion for a “new, morally-grounded metaphysics,” which was to fulfill 
the expectations placed before its old form. In Volkelt’s understanding, 
Kant reformed metaphysics by not breaking with it and instead chang-
ing the way it is understood and practiced. 
Similarly to Liebmann, Volkelt was skeptical about the possibility 
of finding final solutions to metaphysical problems. Yet, his was also 
consistent skepticism, which means that it remained open to the need 
for metaphysics that lies at the basis of metaphysical reflection.37 Along 
with Liebmann, he recognizes that—despite what the Hegelians 
believe—metaphysics is not able to ensure absolute clarity and certainty, 
but only probability, since it cannot attain knowledge about the essence 
of things; due to this, we must come to terms with the particular rela-
tivity of our knowledge in this area. For this reason, critical metaphys-
ics cannot be absolute knowledge, for it can only be based on subjective 
and uncertain elements. If we compare Volkelt’s and Liebmann’s con-
ceptions of critical metaphysics, we will see many similarities that con-
cern, among other things, the recognition of metaphysics as hypothetical 
knowledge about the essence of things and the presumption of a close tie 
between the theory of knowledge and metaphysical reflection. However, 
in terms of content, the following differences may be found. 
In his work Erfahrung und Denken from 1886, Volkelt describes 
the object of metaphysics thusly: “by metaphysics in the broadest sense, 
I understand a science which takes as the object of its question and study 
the essence of reality.”38 The objects of metaphysics are not only the most 
profound matters of finitude and the absolute, reflections on what 
is unknowable, mysterious, and inaccessible to the senses and experi-
ence, but also the object of study of the natural sciences and of psychol-
ogy. Metaphysics understood in this way deal with the essence of such 
37 Cf. J. Volkelt, Über die Möglichkeit der Metaphysik…, p. 12.
38 J. Volkelt, Erfahrung und Denken. Kritische Grundlegung der Erkenntnistheorie 
(Hildesheim, Olms, 2002), p. 433.
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ideas as time and space, as well as matter, force, motion, and substance, 
causality and the law of nature, and consciousness and the unconscious. 
Metaphysics is to ensure a view of reality that is holistic, primeval, 
and intrinsically rooted in the world of the spirit.39
In the context of the essence of objects studied by metaphysics, 
Volkelt’s position towards the Kantian concept of things-in-themselves 
is also essential. In his interpretation, Kant does not question the exis-
tence of a thing-in-itself as the basis of phenomena, but rather accepts 
that this concept is problematic.40
As for Liebmann, the relation of metaphysics to the theory of knowl-
edge is very important, since the possibility of metaphysics is closely 
tied to the recognition of a transsubjective minimum,41 for metaphysics 
is possible when we can penetrate the beyond-subjective, or transsub-
jective. The scope of this penetration marks the limits of metaphysics. 
Metaphysics, as the theory of the most general and final principles 
of reality, constitutes the most important field of knowledge for man, 
since it demonstrates the comprehensible base of the phenomenal world. 
The problem is that depriving metaphysics of a scientific status will lead 
to the loss of its persuasive power for man’s will; if metaphysics had 
the status of a better or worse proven hypothesis, then though it would 
remain important for human life, it would not be as easy to oppose 
it to opposite aspirations stemming from an individual’s character 
and temperament, because one cannot live on hypotheses alone. This 
means that metaphysical hypotheses would need to be transformed 
into individuals’ personal, and thus subjectively certain, convictions.
Metaphysics understood in this way must be situated beyond 
both dogmatism and skepticism. The fact that metaphysics is incon-
clusive should not cause us to give it up.42 Metaphysical skepticism 
opens the door to superficial religiosity, because from its perspective, 
39 Cf. J. Volkelt, Über die Möglichkeit der Metaphysik…, p. 5.
40 Cf. J. Volkelt, Immanuel Kants Erkenntnisstheorie nach ihren Grundprincipien analysiert. 
Ein Beitrag zur Grundlegung der Erkenntnisstheorie (Leipzig 1879), p. 93.
41 See: J. Volkelt, Immanuel Kants Erkenntnisstheorie…, p. 200.
42 Cf. J. Volkelt, Immanuel Kants Erkenntnisstheorie…, p. 7.
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the answers to questions about life and the world can only be achieved 
through feelings, faith, or presentiment. This could not be deep religi-
osity, however, since a metaphysical infidel would not be able to fill his 
religious void with religious certainty.43 Therefore, the consequences 
of an anti-metaphysical standpoint are atheism and amorality. Thus, 
the question of the possibility of metaphysics possesses not only scien-
tific significance, but above all moral. Once again it turns out that there 
is nothing more practical than good, that is, critical, theory. 
 The problem of metaphysics should be looked at holistically in its 
historical context. The principle discussion in philosophy does not con-
cern a given spiritualist or materialist standpoint, nor that of the-
ism, pantheism, or atheism, or even dualism or monism, but rather 
the question of whether reflections on the most general and final ques-
tions about being can be conducted at all. The key issue, then, is that 
of the existence of philosophy without metaphysics, and three positions 
can be taken in regards to this question: dogmatic metaphysics, anti-
metaphysical positivism, and critical metaphysics. The dogmatic way 
of practicing metaphysics concerns speculative metaphysics in the old 
style, which is characterized by the naïve faith that its proceedings 
possess the same probative power as do mathematics.44 Such a formula-
tion is rejected by Neo-Kantians and positivists alike, who—like David 
Hume, August Comte, and John Stuart Mill—“fear stalling in ground-
lessness, when so-called experience is no longer felt directly beneath 
their feet; they consider all interpretation and grasping of experience 
as self-deceit or recklessness.”45 Such metaphysics are also rejected 
by Neo-Kantians, who—in contrast to the positivists—presume 
the existence of a “great Unknown” (ein grosses Unbekanntes), that rules 
43 J. Volkelt, Immanuel Kants Erkenntnisstheorie…, p. 7. Cf. also: J. Volkelt, Die Gefühlsgewissheit. 
Eine erkenntnistheoretische Untersuchung (München: C. H. Beck’sche verlagsbuchhandlung, Oskar 
Beck, 1922), p. 77 ff. (Polish translations of selected passages in: J. Volkelt, Pewność uczuciowa. Wybór 
tekstów, trans. B. Markiewicz [Warszawa: IFiS PAN, 1983]).
44 Cf. J. Volkelt, Immanuel Kants Erkenntnisstheorie…, p. 10.
45 J. Volkelt, Immanuel Kants Erkenntnisstheorie…, pp. 10–11.
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beyond or above the experienced world.”46 Between the positions of dog-
matic metaphysics and anti-metaphysical positivism, a third position 
may be found—that of metaphysicians who believe that “they prac-
tice their science on the basis of, or in the sense of the critical theory 
of knowledge.”47 Such an approach remains under the obvious influence 
of Kant, since „here metaphysics is first given the task of formulating 
problems in the most exact fashion possible and in as close a reference 
to possessed knowledge as attainable, then of distinguishing various 
possible solutions to these problems, and [finally]—of considering argu-
ments for and against each of these solutions from an empirico-logical 
perspective.”48 This type of critical metaphysics is based on our lim-
ited, unreliable, and ultimately uncertain thinking. Among the advo-
cates of cautious metaphysical criticism Volkelt counts such thinkers 
as: Christoph Sigwart, Otto Liebmann, Max Wundt, Rudolph Hermann 
Lotze, and Eduard von Hartmann. Volkelt, in rejecting the dogmatic 
type of metaphysics, recognizes that the problems of metaphysics can-
not be solved in one way that would be completely devoid of obscurities 
and contradictions.49 At most, metaphysics can only propose a greater 
or lesser degree of probability, and the metaphysician cannot in his 
research reach the essence of things, and for this reason must be 
aware of the relativity of his cognition. He must admit that his solu-
tion is only symbolic and analogical, and the findings of his research 
do not have to incline everyone to approve: “above all, the metaphysi-
cian must explain to himself that when it comes to deeper questions 
about principles, individual thought will never express the absolute 
necessity of thought, nor any ideal or eternal logic, and the necessity 
of thought that reigns within man’s head is always only relatively autho-
rized and relatively correct, so in various heads the once absolute, once 
46 J. Volkelt, Immanuel Kants Erkenntnisstheorie…, p. 11. In this context, we can ask whether 
Volkelt’s philosophy fulfills this criterion and can thus be considered Neo-Kantianism.
47 J. Volkelt, Immanuel Kants Erkenntnisstheorie…, p. 11.
48 J. Volkelt, Immanuel Kants Erkenntnisstheorie…, p. 11.
49 J. Volkelt, Immanuel Kants Erkenntnisstheorie…, p. 12.
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ideal necessity of thought is brought about.”50 Hypothetical reflections do 
not have to be universally convincing, which does not mean that clarity 
and convincingness should be forsaken. Metaphysics cannot be counted 
among the exact sciences, since its theorems are not clear enough to put 
undeniable pressure on the normal mind; to the contrary—they are 
generally vague and contradictory. That is why the concept of exact-
ness should be broadened to include “the purest possible conceptual 
distinctions, logically cautious and gradual proceedings, the thought-
ful consideration of all difficulties.”51 It is only when such an expanded 
understanding of exactness is accepted that metaphysics also becomes 
a critical science. In metaphysics, we must take into account in par-
ticular the limitations resulting from empirical cognition, i.e. that all 
metaphysical study must be confirmed within the context of the ability 
to experience and think. The theory of knowledge serves to do just that, 
and metaphysics must presuppose this theory, because without it meta-
physics would fall into credulity or impertinence. However, Volkelt 
believes that—though metaphysics is not an exact science—“it consists 
in the cautious, elucidative application of logic to the facts of experi-
ence and assumes a prudent test of cognition’s authority and eviden-
tiary ability; this is why it can, in a certain sense, claim the right to be 
recognized as exact and exceptionally critical.”52 A critical metaphysics 
that proceeds in this way, as opposed to dogmatic metaphysics, can be 
considered an exact science.
The rejection of dogmatic metaphysics is not equivalent to the skepti-
cal negation of all metaphysics; Volkelt anticipates a new critical meta-
physics (ontology), which designates a road between dogmatism and pos-
itivist skepticism. Questioning dogmatic metaphysics does not imply 
the impossibility of scientifically practicing metaphysics as such, since 
for Volkelt “the decisive quality of scientificality is the logical descrip-
tion of experience, and this quality pertains to metaphysics just as much 
50 J. Volkelt, Immanuel Kants Erkenntnisstheorie…, p. 13.
51 J. Volkelt, Immanuel Kants Erkenntnisstheorie…, pp. 13–14.
52 J. Volkelt, Immanuel Kants Erkenntnisstheorie…, p. 15.
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as to all the remaining sciences.”53 In reality, no science exists which 
would completely satisfy our curiosity in an exact way. In general, 
a modest, but certain result of cognition suffices. 
This is why not only metaphysics itself, but also its progress is pos-
sible, if by progress we do not understand its giving us a greater 
and greater number of truths. For Volkelt, “metaphysical thinking 
progresses deeper and more comprehensively through the fact that 
it is developed by various people in various times and in radically 
and principally different ways; it is precisely by virtue of these never-
ending conflicts and contradictions that it pushes itself to ever richer 
and more exhaustive accomplishments, and takes a position towards 
reality that is increasingly many-sided and better adjusted.”54 There-
fore, we are not speaking about new and innovative truths, but about 
ensuring their universality and many-sidedness. Thus, the goal of crit-
ical metaphysics is a comprehensive consideration of accepted truth, 
which in accordance with reality enjoins differing standpoints. Only 
the progress of metaphysics understood this way can lead to the con-
tinual enrichment, sharpening, and deepening of reflection.55 It is cer-
tainly not given once and for all, but it must transform our points 
of view continually and in various directions. For Volkelt, the most 
essential thing in a metaphysician’s critical approach is that he “turns 
his attention towards the exact continuity in the unstoppable change 
of his metaphysical point of view; if his sight is not weakened by skepti-
cism too severely, he will perceive without difficulty in this continuity 
a progressive approach to truth, though this approach may still remain 
far from the goal.”56 The historical debates in metaphysics attest to its 
perpetual and deliberate pursuit of truth.57 However, it is possible only 
when a minimum of trust is shown, which consists in avoiding one-sided 
evaluations and an awareness of concepts’ internal dynamics. The point 
53 J. Volkelt, Immanuel Kants Erkenntnisstheorie…, p. 17.
54 J. Volkelt, Immanuel Kants Erkenntnisstheorie…, p. 18.
55 J. Volkelt, Immanuel Kants Erkenntnisstheorie…, p. 18.
56 J. Volkelt, Immanuel Kants Erkenntnisstheorie…, p. 19.
57 Cf. J. Volkelt, Immanuel Kants Erkenntnisstheorie…, p. 35ff.
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is not to understand the development of metaphysics from an absolute 
perspective, as Hegel did,58 but from the diverse perspective of the rel-
ative truths it accepts. A historically-produced metaphysical system 
should not be evaluated as false, but at most as one-sided and not abso-
lute, since they certainly took into account many relative necessities 
of thought, which could not, however, be recognized as final. 
 As with Liebmann, Volkelt’s position regarding the possibility 
of metaphysics is characterized by the search for a third way, which 
is why he is opposed to such a presentation of the case that forces one 
to take sides between false alternatives: exact science or none, progress 
or stagnation.59 He views the causes of such a formulation in immaturity 
stemming from arrogance and one-sidedness. For Volkelt, there exists 
a cautious and critical road between the two extremes, on which science 
and progress also exist. 
Volkelt perceives metaphysical components even “in the most exact 
and most recognized theorems, which transcend experience step by step 
and imagine a whole multitude of absolutely unexperienceable factors 
outside of experience.”60 Our daily experience is an enjoinment of the ele-
ments of empirical impressions and perception, and those that are 
non-empirical, having their genesis in our minds and being the prod-
ucts of our imagination, as well as feelings and intentions.61 Concepts 
and thoughts, as well as our conviction about the existence of other 
conscious beings, or finally about the existence of the external world 
also belong to the non-empirical components of experience. Experience 
is made up not only of empirical factors, but also of a priori accepted 
presumptions, which he bluntly describes as the “misery of experience.” 
The point is that experience never provides the basis for a conviction 
about the presence of causal relationships, laws (Gesetzmässigkeit), con-
tinuity, relations, order, unity, or regularity, because “my real conscious 
58 Cf. J. Volkelt, Immanuel Kants Erkenntnisstheorie…, p. 36ff.
59 Cf. J. Volkelt, Immanuel Kants Erkenntnisstheorie…, p. 19.
60 J. Volkelt, Immanuel Kants Erkenntnisstheorie…, p. 21. Cf. also: J. Volkelt, Erfahrung 
und Denken…, p. 294ff.
61 Cf. J. Volkelt, Über die Möglichkeit der Metaphysik…, p. 22.
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processes are the only thing that I experience.”62 For, we do not experi-
ence dependence as such. In our consciousness, we are only given coexis-
tence or succession, which never have their basis in experience since we 
experience sensations, perception, and memories in a discontinuous way. 
Volkelt bases his thesis about the need for metaphysics on the conviction 
that all cognition, both in the empirical sciences and in daily life, must 
on multiple levels reach beyond experience for what is non-empirical.63 
The basic non-empirical component of experience is the presumption 
concerning the (transsubjective) object of judgment, which is located 
outside the subject.64 In the experience that is the basis of every empiri-
cal judgment, we have to accept the non-empirical presumption as to 
the independent existence of the object (i.e. independent from the sub-
ject), that it refers to real phenomena. For Volkelt, “each act of thought, 
each judgment directly judges or concerns the transsubjective object, 
thus it refers to something absolutely unexperienceable.65 This nec-
essary assumption about the transsubjective object of our experience 
is of a completely unempirical character, i.e. it is not based on expe-
rience. In this way, Volkelt blurs the boundary between metaphysics 
and the empirical sciences: “Essentially, metaphysics aspires to the same 
thing as the empirical sciences: it wants to make experience comprehen-
sible on the basis of a logically indispensible plan and of the awareness 
of factors that are not experienced.”66 The task of the proposed (criti-
cal) metaphysics is, then, the study of the presumptions and premises 
of experiential cognition.
Volkelt also refers to the accusation of the inconclusiveness of meta-
physics, namely that in metaphysics, individual orientations and views 
often exclude one another and are contradictory.67 At the same time, 
he notes that this type of accusation is often formulated from contradic-
62 J. Volkelt, Über die Möglichkeit der Metaphysik…, p. 23.
63 J. Volkelt, Über die Möglichkeit der Metaphysik…, p. 25.
64 Cf. J. Volkelt, Über die Möglichkeit der Metaphysik…, p. 37.
65 J. Volkelt, Über die Möglichkeit der Metaphysik…, p. 38.
66 J. Volkelt, Über die Möglichkeit der Metaphysik…, p. 26.
67 Cf. J. Volkelt, Über die Möglichkeit der Metaphysik…, p. 27ff.
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tory perspectives that exclude one another, which attests to the incon-
sistency of the opponents of metaphysics, who, accusing it of contradic-
tions and nonsense, themselves commit similar mistakes. The critique 
of metaphysics and postulate of eliminating metaphysics reveals 
the inconsistency of its opponents. However, conclusions must be drawn 
from metaphysics’ inconclusiveness, and the postulate of self-limiting 
metaphysics must be accepted, so that by eliminating the answers to its 
questions that are impossible to uphold, acceptable possible solutions 
may be found. 
Work on metaphysics also signifies work on the explication of meta-
physical problems.68 Volkelt understands metaphysics as the science 
of problems and draws the conclusion that, if the logical formulation 
of questions is possible, then to a certain degree the logical formulation 
of metaphysical answers must also be possible. This requires logical 
discipline, however. Critical metaphysical theorems must be expressed 
with the stipulation that certain conclusions are logically required, 
but our thinking is unable to go further with the given argument.69 
Thus, the theorems of critical metaphysics are of a postulative, not cat-
egorical, character: they must take the form of conditional judgments 
and, at the same time, express remarks about the weak and strong 
sides of a given theorem. The goal is to confront convictions with vari-
ous reservations in order to elicit hidden loopholes or obscurities. What 
is wanted is a comprehensive test of the accepted theorems from vari-
ous points of view. 
Volkelt’s critical metaphysics does not stand in opposition to the great 
idealistic post-Kantian philosophers, such as Schelling, Hegel, or Scho-
penhauer, because its essential elements are in agreement with the intu-
ition of these thinkers: “And so I can finally, as I am attempting to do, 
describe as unification and penetration the metaphysical idealistic aspi-
rations, as memorably present in, above all, the post-Kantian thinkers, 
68 Cf. J. Volkelt, Über die Möglichkeit der Metaphysik…, pp. 39–40.
69 Cf. J. Volkelt, Über die Möglichkeit der Metaphysik…, p. 28ff.
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as well as the skeptical-critical and epistemological spirit, as it is man-
ifest in Hume’s works and especially in those of the subtly-working, 
though with a flourish, Kant.”70 Thus, Volkelt sought a compromise 
between the extremes of idealism and criticism. 
In conclusion, it is worth noting that the presented compromise 
between science and philosophy that characterizes the critical meta-
physics of Liebmann and Volkelt is, on the one hand, a great advantage, 
since it allows metaphysics to remain in close relation to modern sci-
entific theory and thus to participate in modern techno-scientific civili-
zation. The weak side of this compromise, however, may be that it nar-
rows the universalistic perspective of philosophy to science and rejects 
non-scientific spheres of life. Though critical metaphysics was to be open 
to the metaphysical needs of man, it remained an expression of the sci-
entific aspirations of the turn of the nineteenth century. Metaphys-
ical criticism signifies the self-limitation of metaphysical aspirations, 
but this limitation must have its proper boundaries, because otherwise 
it will transform into destructive skepticism. 
The untranscendental character of their philosophy is also essen-
tial. The role of the transcendental method in Kant’s philosophy was 
strongly emphasized by the main Neo-Kantian schools, especially 
by the Marburg School, while Volkelt—and Liebmann, I presume—
did not interpret it as transcendental philosophy, which is significant 
to their (untranscendental) way of understanding the essence of criti-
cism. In these reflections, however, we only concentrated on the signifi-
cance of critical metaphysics as metaphysics, which is why its relation-
ship to the theory of knowledge was not properly presented. For this 
reason, the relationship of transcendental philosophy to the conception 
of critical metaphysics should become the object of further studies.
70 “Und so darf ich denn schliesslich, was ich erstrebe, bezeichnen als eine Vereinigung 
und Durchdringung des idealistisch metaphysischen Strebens, wie es vor allem die unvergesslichen 
nachkantischen spekulativen Denker erfüllt, und des skeptisch-kritischen und erkenntnistheoretischen 
Geistes, wie er sich in Hume und besonders in dem subtil und zugleich gewaltig arbeitenden Kant 
verkörperte.” J. Volkelt, Über die Möglichkeit der Metaphysik…, p. 31.
Critical Metaphysics in the Views of Otto Liebmann and Johannes Volkelt 99
Bibliography
Bormann K. 1976. “Kritik.” In: Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie. Ed. H. Ritter. 
Bd. IV, 1249–1267. Darmstadt: Schwabe.
Holzhey H. 1976. “Kritik. II. Der Begriff der K. von Kant bis zur Gegenwart.” In: Histo-
risches Wörterbuch der Philosophie. Ed. H. Ritter. Bd. IV, 1267–1282. Darmstadt: 
Schwabe.
Kant I. 1998. Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels oder Versuch 
von der Verfassung und dem mechanischen Ursprunge des ganzen Weltgebäudes, 
nach Newtonischen Grundsätzen abgehandelt. In: Akademieausgabe von Imma-
nuel Kants Gesammelten Werken. Vorkritische Schriften 1747–1777. Bd. I, 215–368. 
Berlin: Karsten Worm.
Kant I. 1929. Critique of Pure Reason. Trans. N. Kemp Smith. London: Macmillan.
Kant I. 1902. Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics. Trans. P. Carus. Chicago: Open 
Court.
Krijnen Ch. 2001. Nachmetaphysischer Sinn. Eine problemgeschichtliche und systema-
tische Studie zu den Prinzipien der Wertphilosophie Heinrich Rickerts. Würzburg: 
Königshausen & Neumann.
Kubalica T. 2014. „Metafizyka krytyczna Otto Liebmanna,” Folia Philosophica 32, 
47–64.
Kuliniak R. 2003. Spór o oczywistość w naukach metafizycznych. Konkurs Królews-
kiej Akademii Berlińskiej z 1763 roku. Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu 
Wrocławskiego.
Laas E. 1884. Idealismus und positivismus: Eine kritische Auseinandersetzung. Ber-
lin: Weidmann.
Lange F. A. 2008. Geschichte des Materialismus und Kritik seiner Bedeutung 
in der Gegenwart. Ed. R. Nölle. Norderstedt: Books on Demand.
Liebmann O. 1884. Die Klimax der Theorien: eine Untersuchung aus dem Bereich 
der allgemeinen Wissenschaftslehre. Straßburg: Georg Olms.
Liebmann O. 1904. “Grundriß der kritischen Metaphysk.” In: Gedanken und Tatsachen, 
Bd. 2, Straßburg: K.J. Trübner.
Noras A. 2011. Historia neokantyzmu. Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego.
Paulsen F. 1893. Einleitung in die Philosophie. 2. Aufl. Berlin: J.S. Cotta‘sche Buch-
handlung Nachfolger.
Rickert H. 1929. Wilhelm Windelband. 2. Aufl. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
Siemek M. 1996. “Wstęp: Teoria wiedzy jako system filozofii transcendentalnej.” 
In: J. G. Fichte, Teoria wiedzy: wybór pism, tom. I, Warszawa: PWN.
Volkelt J. 1922. Die Gefühlsgewissheit. Eine erkenntnistheoretische Untersuchung. Mün-
chen: Beck.
100 Tomasz Kubalica
Volkelt J. 2002. Erfahrung und Denken. Kritische Grundlegung der Erkenntnistheorie. 
Hildesheim: Olms.
Volkelt J. 1879. Immanuel Kants Erkenntnisstheorie nach ihren Grundprincipien ana-
lysiert. Ein Beitrag zur Grundlegung der Erkenntnisstheorie. Leipzig: Voss.
Volkelt J. 1884. Über die Möglichkeit der Metaphysik. Antrittsrede gehalten zu Basel 
am 23. Oktober 1883. Hamburg: Voss.
Windelband W. 1910. “Otto Liebmanns Philosophie,” Kant-Studien 15, III–X.
Windelband W. 1907. Präludien. Aufsätze und Reden zur Einleitung in die Philosophie. 
Bd. I., 3. Aufl., Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
Tomasz Kubalica
Metafizyka krytyczna 
Ottona Liebmanna i Johannesa Volkelta
Streszczenie: Przedmiotem artykułu jest koncepcja metafizyki krytycznej zaprezento-
wana przez Otto Liebmanna i Johannesa Volkelta. Ich koncepcja metafizyki jest wyni-
kiem kompromisu między nauką a filozofią, który z jednej strony pozwala metafizyce 
pozostawać w ścisłym związku ze współczesną teorią naukową i tym samym partycy-
pować w nowożytnej cywilizacji naukowo-technicznej. Z drugiej jednak strony prowadzi 
do zawężenia uniwersalistycznej perspektywy filozofii do nauki i rezygnacji z pozanau-
kowej sfery życia. Tak rozumiana metafizyka krytyczna choć była w założeniu otwar-
ta na metafizyczne potrzeby człowieka, to pozostawała wyrazem aspiracji naukowych 
przełomu wieku dziewiętnastego i dwudziestego. Metafizyczny krytycyzm oznacza 
samoograniczenie metafizycznych aspiracji, lecz to ograniczenie też musi mieć swoje 
słuszne granice, gdyż w przeciwnym razie przekształca się w destrukcyjny sceptycyzm.
Słowa kluczowe: metafizyka krytyczna, uniwersalistyczna koncepcja filozofii, 
współczesna teoria naukowa, krytycyzm filozoficzny, sceptycyzm
